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The present study examined whether mock offenders, who were instructed to falsely
deny crime details or to simulate amnesia, would consequently experience impaired
memory. Ninety‐three university students were first asked to commit a mock crime
and were then assigned to three different conditions (i.e., false denial, simulated
amnesia, and truth telling) and then received the first memory test. The following
day, participants completed a second memory test. Results showed that the memory
impairment was not observed in participants in the false denial condition. However, in
the simulated amnesia group, memory about being interviewed in the first session
was impaired. The simulated amnesia group also had lower recollection and belief rat-
ings in the occurrence of true details for the mock event. Findings suggest that after
simulating amnesia, offenders can forget details related to the interview and exhibit
diminished ratings for the recollection of and belief in their memory for experienced
events.
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In criminal cases, it is not uncommon for offenders to use different
coping strategies in order to minimize culpability or to escape convic-
tion all together. Offenders sometimes (falsely) deny or simulate mem-
ory loss for their criminal involvement (Cima, Merckelbach, Nijman,
Knauer, & Hollnack, 2002; Henning, Jones, & Holdford, 2005). A good
example is that of sex offenders who are sometimes known to use
denial (Barbaree, 1991; Marshall & Barbaree, 1990; Marshall & Eccles,
1991) and other forms of cognitive distortions (e.g., minimization;
Langevin, 1988) as a form of defense (Rogers & Dickey, 1991); how-
ever, the purpose differs somewhat. For instance, sex offenders some-
times deny that their behavior had a harmful effect on victims (i.e.,
denial of victim impact; Happel & Auffrey, 1995). Another way that
sex offenders try to escape legal responsibility is to claim that they- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
the Creative Commons Attribution
ed, the use is non‐commercial and
y Published by John Wiley & Sonshave no recollection of actually committing the act (e.g., “I was intox-
icated”; Marshall, Serran, Marshall, & Fernandez, 2005). However, it
has been argued that in such cases, these claims of amnesia are per-
haps not authentic but are instead fabricated (Marshall et al., 2005).
Eventually, some offenders come forward with what purportedly
happened. A crucial issue is the extent to which the use of cognitive
strategies (e.g., denial and simulated amnesia) can affect the memory
performance of offenders after some time has elapsed. This is the
impetus of the current experiment.2 | DENIALS AND MEMORY
Research has shown that the false denial of information can have a
negative impact on people's confidence and memory accuracy for- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
‐NonCommercial‐NoDerivs License, which permits use and distribution in any
no modifications or adaptations are made.
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Wang, 2016; Otgaar, Romeo, Howe, & Ramakers, 2018; Otgaar,
Scoboria, & Mazzoni, 2014). These results arguably have practical
implications for the way in which we understand and approach socie-
tal problems that people may respond to by employing coping strate-
gies (e.g., child sexual abuse). Indeed, victims of child sexual abuse are
known to deny the occurrence of the abuse (Bussey, 1995).
Victims do this in order to cope with adverse emotional and psy-
chological symptoms, and as such, disclosure of the abuse is some-
times delayed (Jonzon & Lindblad, 2004; London, Bruck, Ceci, &
Shuman, 2005). In one of the first demonstrations of the effect of
denying information on memory, Vieira and Lane (2013) instructed
participants to study several presented pictures (e.g., an apple). Next,
participants had to tell the truth or deny (i.e., lie) about having seen
the pictures (old and new items) by way of denial or fabrication. After
a 48‐hr delay, participants completed a source memory test that
included both the old and new pictures and examined their memory
for the lies that they told in Session 1. Results showed that in compar-
ison with fabricated lies, participants' memory was poorer for lies that
involved the denial of items they had actually seen.
In another line of research, Otgaar and colleagues (Otgaar &
Baker, 2018; Otgaar, Howe, et al., 2016; Otgaar, Howe, Memon, &
Wang, 2014) found that false denials can affect memory. In the
2014 study, participants (children and adults) viewed a video of a
theft. Participants were randomly allocated to three conditions (i.e.,
cued recall, forced confabulation, and false denial). In Session 1, partic-
ipants in the false denial condition were instructed to deny in
response to every question. One day later, all participants received a
second memory test and were instructed to respond truthfully to all
questions. Specifically, during this memory test, participants received
two memory‐related questions. The first one concerned memory of
what had been discussed, whereas the second question referred to
memory of the video. Of main interest to the current experiment is
that Otgaar et al. (Otgaar, Howe, et al., 2014) found that using a cog-
nitive strategy such as false denial led to memory impairment for the
discussion of details with the experimenter.
This denial induced–forgetting (DIF) effect was subsequently rep-
licated using different stimuli (i.e., negative and neutral pictures;
Otgaar et al., 2016) and by testing recall accuracy (Otgaar et al.,
2018). What these experiments have in common is that memory of
details that were seen and subsequently discussed, as opposed to
those merely seen and not discussed, was undermined. Note, how-
ever, that another common ground in these studies is that they all
examined DIF from an eyewitness perspective. As such, the first aim
of the present experiment is to find out whether DIF can also be expe-
rienced by offenders. Secondly, we investigated whether forgetting
can occur as a result of another cognitive strategy that is believed to
yield memory‐undermining effects: simulating amnesia for an offense.3 | SIMULATING AMNESIA AND MEMORY
The number of studies that focus directly on factors related to
offender memory is quite limited. Nevertheless, there is some explor-
atory information about causal factors. Again, we refer to the exampleof sex offenders who sometimes report that they have no recollection
of actually committing the act, and they give different reasons for this
(e.g., blackouts, head injury, and intoxication; Marshall et al., 2005).
However, it is likely that this “amnesia” is often fabricated and not a
case of authentic amnesia (Marshall et al., 2005). The primary conun-
drum here is what effect‐simulated amnesia has on memory when
an offender does decide to provide an honest account.
Research has shown that simulating amnesia undermines memory
for later accounts (Bylin & Christianson, 2002; Christianson & Bylin,
1999; Mangiulli, van Oorsouw, Curci, Merckelbach, & Jelicic, 2018;
Newton & Hobbs, 2015; Van Oorsouw & Merckelbach, 2004 ; Van
Oorsouw & Merckelbach, 2006). Christianson and Bylin (1999) asked
participants to read a description of a crime and act as though they
were the main perpetrator. Participants in the genuine group had to
recall as many details as possible, and the simulation group had to pre-
tend to forget details. After 1 week, participants were reassessed, and
recall accuracy in the simulation group was found to be poorer in com-
parison with the genuine group. Other research also found that simu-
lators of amnesia had significantly worse free‐recall memory in
comparison with an honest group of participants for details of a mock
crime they had committed (Van Oorsouw & Merckelbach, 2004; Van
Oorsouw & Merckelbach, 2006). The proposed mechanism behind
the memory‐undermining effects of simulating amnesia is that simulat-
ing amnesia obstructs the rehearsal and encoding of information in
long‐term memory, thereby resulting in memory impairment
(Christianson & Bylin, 1999; McWilliams, Goodman, Lyons, Newton,
& Avila‐Mora, 2014; Sun, Punjabi, Greenberg, & Seamon, 2009; Van
Oorsouw & Merckelbach, 2004).4 | LYING AND MEMORY
A recently proposed framework (i.e., memory and deception [MAD]
framework; Otgaar & Baker, 2018) provides some understanding of
the mechanisms underlying the effects of false denial and simulated
amnesia on memory. It posits that for different types of deception,
varying amounts of cognitive resources are harnessed. For example,
a false denial such as “No, I did not search the professor's bag” may
require fewer cognitive resources and be less cognitively demanding
than an elaborate simulated amnesia response where someone claims
to have forgotten and adds fabricated details. In general, based on the
MAD theory, the idea is that engaging in any type of lie (e.g., such as
false denials or simulated amnesia) is more cognitively demanding than
telling the truth and as such the idea that it might leave fewer cogni-
tive resources available for the rehearsal of information. The storage
of information into memory is facilitated by rehearsal. Therefore,
when people lie, the storage of information is compromised because
the correct information is neither attended to nor rehearsed, and false
information might become reinforced. In turn, the inadequate
rehearsal of true information can result in the omission of correct
details later on during memory retrieval. Furthermore, if the simulation
of amnesia results in greater cognitive exertion than false denial, then
in theory, the rehearsal process may also be affected more adversely.
This is in line with tenets of the cognitive approach to lie detection that
has been studied in the field of deception research. The fundamental
ROMEO ET AL. 985argument is that lying is strenuous and requires more cognitive
resources than truth telling (DePaulo et al., 2003; Suchotzki, Crombez,
Smulders, Meijer, & Verschuere, 2015; Vrij, 2006; Vrij & Fisher, 2016),
and this can be exploited to more effectively distinguish liars from
truth tellers (Vrij et al., 2008; Vrij, Granhag, Mann, & Leal, 2010).
The MAD framework adds to this by postulating that depending on
the type of lie and even perhaps the amount of consumed cognitive
resources, memory can be affected in different ways (e.g., false mem-
ory and omission).
Relatedly, the memory impairment that is associated with simu-
lated amnesia has been attributed to retrieval‐induced forgetting
(Anderson, Bjork, & Bjork, 1994; Mangiulli et al., 2018). In order to
simulate amnesia, the selective retrieval of information is necessary
in order for the memory of correct information to be inhibited (Ander-
son et al., 1994; van Oorsouw & Merckelbach, 2004). Arguably, such
selectivity would warrant a considerable level of focus and cognitive
effort.
The current experiment examined the memory effects of false
denials and simulated amnesia in a sample of mock offenders. Specif-
ically, memory for the discussion with the interviewer, the actual
event, and recollections of and beliefs pertaining to aspects of the
event were examined. Participants were randomly assigned to three
conditions (i.e., false denial, simulated amnesia, and truth telling) and
received condition‐specific interview questions over two sessions.
We hypothesized that those participants instructed to falsely deny
or simulate amnesia for details of the mock crime, would perform
worse than (truth telling) controls in a 24‐hr delayed memory test.
Additionally, for exploratory reasons, we also measured participants'
belief and memory ratings of their recollections (Otgaar, Scoboria, &
Mazzoni, 2014).5 | METHOD
5.1 | Participants
Using G*Power (Faul, Erdfelder, Lang, & Buchner, 2007), an a priori
power analysis with a power of 0.80 and medium to high effect size
( f = 0.33) indicated a sample of 93 participants was required.
Ninety‐three undergraduate students (78 females) from different uni-
versities in the Netherlands were tested. Their mean age was
21.92 years (SD = 2.30; range 18–29 years). Compensation for Ses-
sions 1 and 2 consisted of university credits or a voucher worth
€7.50. The ethical committee of the Faculty of Psychology and Neuro-
science of Maastricht University granted ethical permission (reference
number: ECP 158_02_11_2015). Data for the study can be accessed
on the Open Science Framework: https://osf.io/tz3jx/5.2 | Materials, design, and procedure
The experiment used a between‐subjects design, and participants
were randomly assigned to the false denial (n = 31), simulated amnesia
(n = 31), or truth telling/control conditions (n = 31). Participants were
recruited from Maastricht University and other universities in the
Netherlands via posters and advertisements on social media. Afterthe mock crime was committed, participants were informed that they
would be interviewed about the event. The study was divided into
two sessions. In Session 1, participants committed the mock crime
after which the first memory test was administered.
5.2.1 | Mock crime
Participants received a note with a set of instructions. The note stated
that there was a statistics exam scheduled to occur in 1 week and that
many students found the exam to be very difficult. Participants were
told that it would be in their best interest to have the answers to
the exam beforehand. To access the answers, they had to gain access
to the statistics professor's email using a password. They were
instructed to take a pen (to write down the password) and go to the
professor's lab where the password could be found. The password
was then used on a computer in an adjacent room to gain access to
the professor's email account. Answers to the exam were to be found
in the professor's email and participants had to forward the email con-
taining the answers to a certain email address before logging out and
returning to the main experimental room.
5.2.2 | Session 1 and condition assignment
Directly after the mock crime, a first memory test was administered as
an interview and it consisted of nine questions (e.g., “Did you enter
the next room afterwards?”). This memory test was formatted as a
structured interview and was used to assess participants' memories
for the mock crime. Two of the nine questions contained false detail
information about events that did not occur and were unrelated to
what the participants had to do in the mock crime (e.g., “Did you steal
a key?”, see Appendix A). A priori to their participation, participants
were randomly assigned to one of three conditions, and as a result,
participants received instructions that differed between the three con-
ditions. Truth tellers were instructed to tell the truth in response to all
of the questions, the false deniers had to deny the facts for all the
questions (e.g., “No, I did not search the professor's bag”), and the
amnesia simulators were instructed to simulate memory loss for the
mock crime (e.g., “My memory is vague; I cannot remember searching
the bag”). Similar to Van Oorsouw and Giesbrecht (2008), for this task,
participants in the simulated amnesia condition were told that they
could avoid punishment by simulating memory loss for the mock crime
(see Appendix A) and that simply saying they could not remember any-
thing was not sufficient. Therefore, they had to make a concerted
effort to convince the interviewer of their memory loss. Responses
for all of the conditions were coded as “yes” (i.e., when the participant
admitted details), “no” (i.e., when the participants denied details), or “I
don't know” (i.e., when the participant simulated memory loss for
details). See Appendix B for the specific instructions.
5.2.3 | Session 2
The second memory test was completed 24 hr after the mock crime
and measured memory for the interview with the experimenter (e.g.,
“When I talked to you yesterday, did we talk about whether you stole
the e‐mail password of the professor?”) and measured memory for the
ROMEO ET AL.986mock crime (e.g., “Did you steal the e‐mail password of the
professor?”).
The second memory test contained all nine items (seven true
detail and two false detail questions) from the first memory test, along
with two false detail filler items. Each item had four questions. The
first two questions for each item pertained to specific event details,
and participants were instructed to answer truthfully to all questions
in either a “yes/no” manner. The first question probed for whether
certain information was discussed with the interviewer (see above).
The second question was related to the participants' actual memory
for the event (see above). The last two questions for each item were
exploratory in nature and were rated on an eight‐point Likert scale.
They examined participants' beliefs (e.g., “To what extent is it possible
that you searched the bag?”) and recollections for the event (e.g., “Do
you actually remember searching the bag?”; see Appendix C). Ratings
were completed on an eight‐point Likert scale for beliefs (that is, 1
[definitely did not happen] to 8 [definitely did happen]) and recollection
(that is, 1 [definitely no memory at all] to 8 [very clear memory];
Scoboria, Mazzoni, Kirsch, & Relyea, 2004). Correct memories for
the mock event were identified by consistency in responses to the
nine original questions from the first interview.6 | RESULTS
6.1 | Memory for the interview
Our first analyses focused on whether we could detect a DIF effect.
Data from the second memory test are shown in Table 1. A one‐way
analysis of variance (ANOVA) showed that for correctly recalled true
items, there was a statistically significant main effect, F (2,
90) = 3.40, p = 0.04, ηp
2 = 0.07, and such an effect was also found
for presented false items that were answered correctly, F (2,TABLE 1 Mean number of correctly recalled items (out of a maximum of 7




Memory for the interview
True items 5.97 1.05 85.29
False items 0.65 0.80 32.5
Memory for the mock event
True items 6.81 0.48 97.28
False items 2.00 0.00 100
Recollection ratings
True items 7.70 0.50 —
False items 1.19 0.57 —
Belief ratings
True items 7.70 0.45 —
False items 1.55 1.04 —
Believed memories 6.48 1.23 —
Note. These results are from the memory test in Session 2. The first two main
Percentages for these row are indicative of accuracy. Exploratory information
fourth main rows. Percentages for these rows are indicative of belief and accur
and belief ratings (score of 7 or 8 on the Likert scale). Mean results were out o90) = 6.80, p < 0.01, ηp2 = 0.13. Post hoc Bonferroni‐corrected com-
parisons showed that in contrast to the truth telling/control condition
(M = 6.55, CI [6.28, 6.81] for true items and M = 1.39, 95% CI [1.11,
1.67] for false items), participants in the simulated amnesia condition
were statistically significantly more likely to deny having talked about
both true items (M = 5.97, 95% CI [5.58, 6.35]; p = 0.04) and false
items from the first interview (M = 0.65, 95% CI [0.35, 0.94];
p < 0.01). Other comparisons (i.e., false denial condition versus truth
telling/control) were not statistically significant (all ps > 0.05). These
effects show the simulated amnesia group evinced a forgetting effect
that has been found in previous studies on the effects of false denials
on memory (i.e., DIF).6.2 | Memory for the mock crime
A Kruskal–Wallis nonparametric test analysis was used because of vio-
lations of homogeneity. This analysis indicated no statistically signifi-
cant effects between the conditions for memory of true items,
H(2) = 4.97, p = 0.08, and false items, H(2) = 2.93, p = 0.23.
An alternative way to examine whether false denials or simulating
amnesia might have affected memory for the mock crime is to look at
the recollection ratings as a function of the conditions. A one‐way
ANOVA was conducted for recollection ratings, and we found a statis-
tically significant condition effect— F (2, 90) = 5.98, p < 0.01, ηp2 = 0.12.
Post hoc Bonferroni‐corrected comparisons showed a statistically sig-
nificant difference between the groups for recollection ratings. Partic-
ipants in the simulated amnesia group had the lowest recollection
ratings (M = 7.70, CI [7.51, 7.88]) when compared with the false denial
(M = 7.97, CI [7.90, 8.03]) and truth telling groups (M = 7.93, CI [7.85,
8.01]). Due to violations of the assumption of homogeneity of vari-
ance, a Kruskal–Wallis nonparametric test was also conducted, and
the analysis showed a statistically significant condition effect for thefor true items and 2 for false items) and belief and recollection ratings
False denial Truth telling
Mean SD % Mean SD %
6.42 0.96 91.71 6.55 0.72 93.57
1.00 0.82 50 1.39 0.76 69.50
6.97 0.18 99.57 6.97 0.18 99.57
1.94 0.25 97 1.90 0.30 95
7.97 0.18 — 7.93 0.22 —
1.26 0.88 — 1.26 0.87 —
7.92 0.25 — 7.89 0.23 —
1.56 1.35 — 1.45 1.07 —
7.13 0.72 — 7.03 0.91 —
rows pertain to memory of the interview and memory of the mock crime.
that was rated on an eight‐point Likert scale is contained in the third and
acy. The last row pertains to events that received equally high recollection
f a maximum of 7 for true items and 2 for false items.
ROMEO ET AL. 987recollection ratings of true events, H(2) = 17.48, p < 0.01, with the
simulated amnesia condition having the lowest mean score. A one‐
way ANOVA analysis did not show a statistically significant difference
for recollection ratings for false items or filler items (ps > 0.05).7 | EXPLORATORY ANALYSES
We also explored participants' belief ratings and believed memories
concerning presented and nonpresented items in the mock crime. A
one‐way ANOVA was conducted for belief ratings, and we found a
statistically significant condition effect— F (2, 90) = 4.37, p = 0.02,
ηp2 = 0.09). Post hoc Bonferroni‐corrected comparisons showed a sta-
tistically significant difference between the groups for belief ratings.
Participants in the simulated amnesia group had the lowest belief rat-
ings (M = 7.70, CI [7.53, 7.86]) for true details from the mock crime
when compared with the false denial (M = 7.92, CI [7.82, 8.01]) and
truth telling groups (M = 7.89, CI [7.81, 7.98]). Due to violations of
the assumption of homogeneity of variance, a Kruskal–Wallis non-
parametric test analysis was also conducted, and a statistically signifi-
cant condition effect was found for belief ratings for true details—
H(2) = 8.05, p = 0.02—with a mean rank of 38 for the simulated amne-
sia, 52 for false denial, and 50 for truth telling. The result indicates that
the simulated amnesia group believed less in the occurrence of the
events than the other groups. The assumption of homogeneity of var-
iance was not violated for the mean total belief ratings for false details
and filler details. A one‐way ANOVA did not show a statistically signif-
icant condition effect for belief ratings for false details (p > 0.05).
Questions that received a high rating for both recollection and
belief (i.e., 7 or 8 on the eight‐point Likert scale) constituted as
believed memories. Kruskal–Wallis nonparametric test analysis results
showed that for believed memories—H(2) = 5.85, p = 0.05—the simu-
lated amnesia condition had the lowest mean rank of 38 in comparison
with mean ranks of 50 for the control condition and 52 for the false
denial condition.8 | DISCUSSION
The principal goal of the current experiment was to investigate the
memory effects of false denials and simulated amnesia for a mock
crime. Previous research has shown that memory accuracy for the
occurrence of lies that were told is poorer when people are instructed
to falsely deny different aspects of an experience (Vieira & Lane,
2013). Research has also revealed that the remembrance of discussion
about details during an interview can be impaired, when those details
were initially falsely denied (i.e., DIF; Otgaar, Howe, et al., 2014;
Otgaar, Scoboria, et al., 2016; Otgaar et al., 2018).
In previous DIF studies by Otgaar and colleagues (Otgaar & Baker,
2018; Otgaar, Howe, et al., 2014; Otgaar, Howe, et al., 2016), partici-
pants were exposed to stimuli such as pictures and videos; however,
the question begs to be asked if these effects would still manifest
under more physically demanding conditions. In fact, this issue has
recently been addressed in a study where participants were immersed
in a virtual reality (VR) environment and saw a realistic scene of a
plane crash site. In line with previous work that examined the effectsof lying on memory, results showed a forgetting effect for the discus-
sion of details during the interview and details from the actual VR
scene, in participants who were directed to falsely deny details
(Romeo, Otgaar, Boerboom, Landström, & Smeets, 2018).
At odds with previous findings (e.g., Otgaar, Howe, et al., 2016), we
did not find evidence for DIF for participants that were instructed to
falsely deny in the current study. What could be the reason for these
findings? Previous research on DIF differed in many respects from the
current experiment. For example, previous research focused on false
denials from amore victim/eyewitness perspectivewhereas the current
experiment concentrated on the perspective of a perpetrator. Perhaps
in the case of people who are acting in the role of a perpetrator, false
denials only have a memory‐impairing effect when it is done under
the added cognitive strain of interacting significantly within an environ-
ment. If performing an action as opposed to being a passive observer
and physical immersion possibly mitigated the memory effects of false
denial, this may mean that there are contextual differences in the way
that different cognitive strategies. That is, false denial may be less effec-
tive in impairingmemory for experiences inwhich people are active par-
ticipants (e.g., someone committing a crime). So, our experiment
suggests that there may be a boundary to the DIF effect in that the
effect disappears when people are actively involved in an event and
then have to falsely deny having experienced certain details. Of course,
future studies should try to replicate this by experimentally examining
the memory performance of both mock offenders and victims who
falsely deny information for the same mock crime.
Our results dovetail nicely with research showing that memory for
self‐performed actions is superior tomemory for witnessed events (e.g.,
Zimmer & Engelkamp, 1999). This action superiority effect might have
occurred here as well because participants had to act as an offender
and were engaged in several crime‐related actions (e.g., stealing pass-
word). According to the MAD framework (Otgaar & Baker, 2018),
memory‐undermining effects of deception will likely only occur if the
act of deception (e.g., false denial or simulating amnesia) consumes
enough cognitive resources to interfere with the ability to rehearse
information. Because participants remembered their “offense” quite
well, the act of a simple denial might not be sufficient to inhibit rehearsal
and produce memory undermining effects. Simulating amnesia is
assumed to use more cognitive resources than denial. It was empha-
sized to participants in the simulated amnesia group that in addition to
saying that they could not remember, they should also consciously exert
effort to feign memory loss (see Appendix B), so this might explain why
we only found observed a forgetting effect in simulators.
Another possible explanation for the failure to replicate DIF in the
false denial condition could simply be due to the type of stimuli used
in the study. Pictures were used in some still studies (i.e., Otgaar,
Howe, et al., 2016; Vieira & Lane, 2013), whereas others included
video (Otgaar, Howe, et al., 2014; Otgaar et al., 2018). Participants
in this study were instructed to write, move between rooms, and
operate a laptop, which arguably required them to be more cognitively
stimulated. It is known that arousal can heighten attention to environ-
mental details (Storbeck & Clore, 2008). Therefore, engaging in a more
physically and perceptually demanding task such as a mock crime may
have increased the focus of participants, making it more difficult to
forget details.
ROMEO ET AL.988We did find a forgetting effect in the simulating amnesia condi-
tion. Because simulating amnesia requires denial to some extent, an
adverse effect on memory was anticipated and ultimately supported
by the findings. The observed forgetting effect in the simulated amne-
sia is not completely novel because other research that examined the
effects of simulating amnesia for committed offences has also demon-
strated that it produces memory‐undermining effects (e.g.,
Christianson & Bylin, 1999; Mangiulli et al., 2018; Sun et al., 2009;
Van Oorsouw & Merckelbach, 2004). Although our procedure is a far
stretch from how offenders commit crimes in real life, the fact that
participants adopted a stance that is similar to real offenders, our find-
ings can in the least act as an inspiratory point for thoughts about how
real offenders may be affected.
Analyses showed that the simulated amnesia condition had com-
paratively lowers belief ratings than the false denial and truth telling
conditions. This is somewhat consistent with the propositions made
by the MAD framework (Otgaar & Baker, 2018). Because fabricating
events increases belief that those events occurred (Polage, 2012),
perhaps it is possible that simulating amnesia decreases the belief
that the event happened. This parallels research showing that people
reduce the belief in the occurrence of experienced events when their
memories are challenged. For example, Mazzoni, Clark, and Nash
(Mazzoni, 2014) found that misleading participants by telling them that
they did not perform actions that they had in fact performed reduced
subsequent belief ratings for those actions (also see for related work
Otgaar, Howe, et al., 2016). However, this research shows that external
pressure can affect the belief that people have in experiences. In the
current experiment, participants challenged their own memories by,
for example, simulating amnesia. Future research might examine
whether internal or external challenges on one's experiences are equally
likely to affect the belief in occurrence of those experiences. Because
in real life, most offenders are not immediately interviewed after a crime
is committed, it is also worth exploring how DIF presents after longer
time intervals.
The results supported the idea that forgetting can in fact be
induced in perpetrators of (mock) crimes. We also found that
simulated amnesia resulted in lower belief ratings in comparison with
when false denial or no strategy was used. It has been reported that
a substantial portion of defendants claims memory loss for the
offence they are accused of (Cima et al., 2002; Kopelman, 1995).
These findings bring both therapeutic and legal implications to mind.
For example, due to the very taboo nature of the act, people who
commit sexual offences are known to use cognitive strategies (Rogers
& Dickey, 1991) such as false denial to cope and/or absolve them-
selves of wrongdoing (Marshall et al., 2005). Sex offenders' ability
and readiness to overcome denial is considered to be a key compo-
nent in their treatment (West Midlands Probation Service, 1996),
and fragmented memories or reduction in belief of the criminal event
may affect the therapeutic process (Marshall, 1994; Schneider &
Wright, 2004). As for a legal impact, if a defendant's memory or belief
for an event is altered, they may not be able to give an accurate
statement. The account of a defendant who is in denial for an
offence and who is repeatedly interviewed may change over
time, casting additional doubts on their credibility (Malloy, Lamb, &
Cutler, 2010).9 | LIMITATIONS
The factors (e.g., emotions) that are present in the experience of a
mock crime versus a real crime will naturally differ in some ways.
However, this study was designed in a manner that closely reflects
some aspects of the experience of a real crime (e.g., deception). Nev-
ertheless, the findings of our experiment may not necessarily be gen-
eralizable to real offenders, and this underscores the constraints of
generality of laboratory experiments (Simons, Shoda, & Lindsay, 2017).
It is possible that our observed memory effect was the result of
demand characteristics, a matter that has been acknowledged in previ-
ous studies that examined the effects of denial on memory. For exam-
ple, in the study by Otgaar, Howe, Smeets, and Wang (Otgaar, Howe,
et al., 2016), the authors noted the possibility of participants' contin-
ued compliance with instructions that were given in the first session.
However, in a study that used a methodology that differed only
slightly from the current experiment (i.e., a second experimenter in
the second session to reduce compliance; Otgaar, Howe, et al.,
2014; Otgaar, Scoboria, & Mazzoni, 2014) to examine DIF, the effect
still emerged. Although demand characteristics cannot be completely
ruled out, it is unlikely to have been an influential factor in the current
experiment.10 | CONCLUSION
In conclusion, our findings suggest a boundary effect to DIF and a gen-
uine adverse memory effect to simulated amnesia from the perspec-
tive of a person who is acting in the role of an offender. We found
that forgetting about the occurrence of discussions about critical
aspects of their experiences can occur in offenders who simulate
amnesia for a mock crime. A forgetting effect that in essence is akin
to that of DIF was found in participants that were instructed to simu-
late amnesia. Specifically, simulators were less likely to remember that
they talked with the experimenter about certain details of the mock
crime than the other participants. Additionally, in contrast to the other
groups, simulators had lower recollection and belief ratings for the
occurrence of true events from the mock crime. The findings herein
illustrate that even when someone commits a crime, they can forget
that they discussed details of the event if they simulate amnesia with
the motivation to diminish responsibility and reduce the believability
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